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From AT&T to Brand X:  Declining Checks and Balances
in an Increasingly Complex Marketplace
ROSS G. HICKS*
I. INTRODUCTION
When President Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act of 1996,1
he used the same pen that President Eisenhower used to sign legislation for
the Interstate Highway system into law.  It was a fitting analogy.  In the
same way that the interstate road system was expected to open up interstate
commerce, the Internet system was expected to open up electronic com-
merce.  In signing the 1996 legislation into law, President Clinton and
Congress were updating the regulatory and legislative framework to adapt
it to the new realities and opportunities provided by the Internet.  The leg-
islation noted that broadband access to the Internet was critical to the con-
tinued economic vitality of the United States.2
In contrast to the success of the Interstate Highway system, however,
broadband adoption in the United States has lagged behind that of other
developed nations.3  Against this backdrop, in National Cable & Telecom-
munications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,4 the Supreme Court held
that, under the Telecommunications Act, cable modem providers are not
required to provide access to other Internet Service Providers (ISPs), de-
spite the fact that local telephone providers had been required to provide
access to third party Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) providers.  As a result,
the goal of increased broadband adoption now falls squarely on the unfet-
tered administrative choices made by the FCC.
Over and above the direct implications to the high speed Internet ac-
cess industry, Brand X raises questions regarding the level of deference
Article III courts afford administrative agencies where the issues involve
 * J.D. Candidate, Franklin Pierce Law Center, 2007.  The author would like to thank Charles
Blazer, Justin Maleson, David Roccio, Matthew Barthalow, Anna Bulas, Christopher Hanba, Professor
Jeffrey Roy, and Professor Alice Briggs for their extraordinarily helpful feedback and suggestions.
 1. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
 2. See id. at 56, 77.
 3. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD BROADBAND
STATISTICS (2006), http://www.oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband [hereinafter OECD BROADBAND
STATISTICS].  For example, Canada, Sweden, Korea, and Denmark all out-rank the United States in
broadband subscribers per 100 habitants.  Id.
 4. 545 S. Ct. 2688 (2005).
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extraordinary technical complexity.  Traditionally, agencies have been
entitled to significant deference in the resolution of cases and controversies
that require a high level of technical sophistication and expertise.5  To that
end, Congress routinely delegates authority to agencies to promulgate rules
and adjudicate disputes that require expertise in narrow technical fields
because of the expertise assumed to be available to agency personnel.6
Likewise, in recognition of this expertise, courts routinely defer to agency
adjudications.
The Brand X case, however, poses the question of whether such rou-
tine deference has gone too far.  The FCC’s interpretation of the statute’s
terminology not only contorts its meaning but also may conflict with Con-
gress’s regulatory framework.  Congress promulgated significant legisla-
tion for the entry ramps to the information superhighway, but relatively
little legislation for the superhighway itself.7  The FCC followed Con-
gress’s structure by initially imposing significant regulation for the DSL
entry ramps.8  By contrast, however, the FCC imposed very little regula-
tion on the functionally equivalent “cable modem” entry ramps.9  Although
legitimate policy reasons may have led the FCC to make that “fresh analy-
sis” of the need for regulation of all high speed entry ramps, such a new
analysis should be confined to the legislative framework.  If the new eco-
nomic realities of the analysis require making a choice outside the legisla-
tive framework, the FCC should be required to seek legislative changes.
By allowing the FCC to “define” away key concepts of the legislative
framework, the Court has weakened the checks and balances that would be
in place had the FCC been forced to seek additional legislative approval to
reform the relevant provisions of the Telecommunications Act.
This note examines the administrative law implications of the Brand X
decision.  First, this note reviews the history and legal context framing the
decision.10  Then, this note examines the decision itself from a textual,
historical, and policy perspective.11  It is concluded that, while agencies
offer welcome expertise for resolving complex questions, deference to
agency expertise should not trump Congressional guidance to the con-
trary.12
 5. See generally ALFRED C. AMAN & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ch. 1 (2d ed.
2001).
 6. Id. at 11.
 7. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-202 (2006).
 8. Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2711.
 9. Id.
 10. Infra Parts II, III, IV.A.
 11. Infra Parts IV.B-D.
 12. Infra Part V.
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II. BACKGROUND
This Part examines the key statutory, judicial, and administrative deci-
sions made prior to the Brand X decision in order to provide the context for
this case.
A.  Telecommunications Antitrust History
For much of the twentieth century, telephone service was heavily
regulated, with long distance service under the authority of the FCC and
local calls under the jurisdiction of state regulators.13  Such a regulatory
regime made sense since virtually every aspect of the telephone infra-
structure was managed by a single corporation, namely American Tele-
phone and Telegraph (AT&T).14  While some rural areas were serviced by
small companies, those companies had to connect to the AT&T infra-
structure to provide long distance service.15  Given the monopoly of the
AT&T system, the wisdom of the regulatory environment was seldom
questioned since competition would incur the cost of duplication of copper
wiring to each household.16
In the 1970s, however, corporations demanded increasing telecommu-
nications capabilities that AT&T could not readily supply.17  Out of the
conflict between the long standing monopoly and the unmet demand for
telecommunications capabilities was borne an antitrust lawsuit.18  The law-
suit culminated in a consent decree in 1982.19  This decree divided the
telephone industry into local telephony (which continued to be a monop-
oly) and long distance telephony (which was now subject to competition).20
Not surprisingly, AT&T’s skirmishes with the Department of Justice
did not first surface until the 1970s.  Initial concerns of monopolistic ef-
fects commenced almost 100 years earlier and periodically surfaced
through to the early seventies.21  In 1934, with AT&T controlling more
 13. See generally PAUL VALLE-RIESTRA, TELECOMMUNICATIONS (2002).
 14. See id. at 10.
 15. See id. at 11.
 16. PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE, COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 15-18 (1999).
 17. See generally GERALD W. BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION AGE
111-16 (1994).
 18. See VALLE-RIESTRA, supra note 13, at 10-11.
 19. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C. 1983) [hereinafter AT&T Reorganiza-
tion Plan Case] (setting out the approved AT&T reorganization plan); United States v. AT&T, 552 F.
Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) [hereinafter AT&T Consent Decree Case] (setting out the terms of the con-
sent decree).
 20. VALLE-RIESTRA, supra note 13, at 11.
 21. In the late 1800s, upon the expiry of its patents, AT&T permitted only those independent tele-
phone companies who were licensed by AT&T to connect into its nationwide telephone system.  Fol-
lowing a period when AT&T acquired many of these independent telephone companies, the Depart-
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than eighty percent of the telephones, telephone lines, and long distance
lines, Congress acted decisively.22  It both enacted the Communications
Act and created the FCC.23  Such dominance by AT&T continued until
1969 when MCI, then a small telecommunications company, offered to
provide a price-competitive, value-added long distance service for business
clients using microwave technology.24  Although required to provide local
connectivity for long distance companies such as MCI,25 AT&T obstructed
the development of such competing long distance services.26  With the
demand for specialized data transmission services outstripping AT&T’s
ability to provide such services, the need for further regulatory enforce-
ment resulted in yet another antitrust lawsuit in 1974.27  This lawsuit ended
in the famous consent decree mandating the breakup of AT&T by 1984.28
This event, at a time of the Reagan revolution,29 also marked a dividing
line between an FCC whose regulatory mode was primarily one of implicit
fairness and an FCC whose regulatory mode was now concerned with eco-
nomic efficiency.30
ment of Justice launched an antitrust lawsuit in 1912, which resulted in an agreement with AT&T that
required AT&T to seek prior approval when acquiring an independent telephone company.  Concerns
surfaced again in the thirties, but World War II forestalled any government responses.  However, in
1949, accusations of anti-competitive transfer pricing policies resulted in a further agreement that
prohibited forays by AT&T into the nascent computer fields.  See id. at 9-11.
 22. Id. at 10.
 23. Id.  In addition to creating the FCC and establishing regulations for telephone services, the
Communications Act of 1934 also established a regulatory framework for radio services, and enacted
provisions regarding judicial review and enforcement.  See S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 2 (1995).
 24. The FCC, by a four-three vote, approved MCI’s application as an experiment rather than as an
initial implementation of a new pro-competitive telecommunications policy.  See BROCK, supra note
17, at 113-15.
 25. The successful MCI application triggered additional demand for such services, accompanied by
additional applications to provide similar services.  In 1971, the FCC responded by reaching its Spe-
cialized Common Carrier (SCC) decision, a new pro-competitive policy, that required AT&T to pro-
vide local interconnectivity with companies such as MCI.  See id. at 116-17.
 26. VALLE-RIESTRA, supra note 13, at 11.
 27. See id.
 28. AT&T Consent Decree Case, 552 F. Supp. 131, 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
 29. “The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 was a watershed for deregulatory action, in part be-
cause executive appointments to agencies and courts accomplished change that would have been far
more difficult to enact in a legislative arena.”  AUFDERHEIDE, supra note 16, at 26.
 30. The prior regulatory notion of “implicit fairness” can best be captured by the requirements of
universal telephone service, telephone connectivity without discrimination, and subsidized telephone
service for the poor.  Such requirements were often used to justify maintaining the highly regulated
system served by the AT&T monopoly.  By contrast, the new regulatory mode of economic efficiency
focused on the public interest being better served by replacing paternalistic governmental regulation
with deregulated marketplace efficiency.  Moreover, proponents of the new pro-competitive regulatory
approach were quick to remind opponents that the purpose of the 1934 Communications Act was to
offer “a rapid, efficient . . . communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.”  See
id. at 22-28.
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B.  The Telecommunications Act of 1996
In 1996, Congress, in its first significant revision of the 1934 Commu-
nications Act, further deregulated telecommunications by opening both
long distance and local calling markets to competition.31
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 updated the Communications
Act of 1934 by encouraging the deployment of advanced telecommunica-
tions services (including broadband Internet access) through a national
legislative policy of deregulation and competition.32  The 1996 Act relied
upon the definitions developed by the FCC in its “Computer Inquiries”
findings.33  These FCC findings established an architectural framework
that distinguished between “basic services” (i.e., regular telephone voice
calls) and “enhanced services” (i.e., data processing services).34
Congress adopted the FCC’s distinction between the two services.  In
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, these two services were re-named as
“telecommunications services” and “information services” respectively,
and definitions were provided in the legislation.35  Further, “telecommuni-
cations carriers” were defined as “provider(s) of telecommunications serv-
ices” and made subject to common carrier regulations that required provi-
sion of carrier services on a non-discriminatory reasonably priced basis.36
In addition to the mandatory regulatory framework noted above, Con-
gress also provided for a “forbearance” mechanism by which the FCC
could relax the stringent common carrier regulatory regime, provided cer-
tain requirements were met.37  Such requirements captured various public
policy and customer protection concerns.38
In summary, Congress modernized the Communications Act by estab-
lishing a regulatory regime centered on the bifurcated functional frame-
work of telecommunications access and information services.39  Telecom-
munications access to consumers was deemed to be susceptible to mo-
nopolistic concerns and warranted significant regulatory controls.40  Infor-
mation services, on the other hand, were to be left largely unregulated.41
 31. 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-272 (2000).
 32. See VALLE-RIESTRA, supra note 13, at 12.
 33. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2688 (2005).
 34. See id. at 2697.
 35. 47 U.S.C. § 153(20), (46) (2006).
 36. Id. §§ 153(44), 201-202.
 37. See id. § 160.  This was the method chosen by Congress by which the FCC could relax common
carrier requirements provided certain enumerated factors had been met.  See S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 50
(1995).
 38. 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2000).
 39. Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2697.
 40. See id. at 2696.
 41. Id.
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Using the information superhighway analogy, Congress determined that
the exit/entry ramps (the telecommunications access) warranted strict
regulatory controls due to the lack of competitive pressures and the likeli-
hood of unreasonable tolls being charged.42  However, mindful that suffi-
cient competitive pressures might surface to alleviate the fear of monopo-
listic toll charges, Congress specified that under such circumstances regu-
latory controls could be lifted using the “forbearance” route.43
The importance of this distinction was apparent in the FCC’s decision
that cable modem providers were not telecommunications providers and,
therefore, were not subject to Title II common carrier regulations.  Since
the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (and even before),
the FCC began to consider where cable modem providers fit in its bifur-
cated regulatory structure.  The first significant FCC response on this issue
was published as a working paper.44  The paper noted that cable modem
providers claimed that cable modem Internet service fell under the cable
service provisions of the Act, thus avoiding the onerous Title II common
carrier requirements.45  Eventually, after several years, the FCC finally
issued its ruling that cable modem providers were indeed not subject to
common carrier regulations, by holding that they did not provide telecom-
munications access.46  Such a ruling triggered the chain of events leading
to the Brand X case.
C.  Technology Development in the Telecommunications Market
In the early 1980s, the break-up of AT&T via the Department of Jus-
tice consent decree of 1982 created two distinct markets within the tele-
communications industry: the local market (providing local calls) and the
long distance market.47  The local market remained a monopoly and was
subject to significant regulation, while the long distance market was
opened to competition.48
 42. See generally id.
 43. Id.
 44. BARBARA ESBIN, FCC, INTERNET OVER CABLE: DEFINING THE FUTURE IN TERMS OF THE PAST
(1998), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp30.pdf.
 45. “Subchapter II is commonly referred to as Title II, which is the heading used in the Communi-
cations Act and its various amendments, but which is not used in the codified version of the Act.”
VALLE-RIESTRA, supra note 13, at 15.  Title II imposes a stringent regulatory regime on those entities
deemed to be common carriers.  For example, common carriers are required to provide service to the
public at reasonable rates and without unreasonable discrimination.  47 U.S.C. §§ 201-202 (2006);
ESBIN, supra note 44, at 89-90.
 46. In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17
F.C.C.R. 4798, 4819 (2002) [hereinafter FCC Cable Modem Ruling].
 47. VALLE-RIESTRA, supra note 13, at 11.
 48. See id.
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In a similar fashion, the FCC split the telecommunications industry
into two markets, but its split was based on usage.49  The first market, tele-
communications services, was heavily regulated.50  The second market,
information services (which used regular telephone technology to accom-
plish data processing services over distance), was not considered to be un-
der the threat of a monopoly and thus was subject to far less regulation.51
The same dichotomy continued into the 1990s, as initial Internet usage
developed using dial-up technology.52  Local telephone service providers
were considered telecommunications providers and the Telecommunica-
tions Act required these local providers to make their telephone wire fa-
cilities available to all ISPs that requested it.53  Conversely, informational
providers were not required to accommodate competitors and were free to
pursue their own build out strategy without obligations to third parties.54
Availability of telecommunications facilities remained an issue as
technology evolved in the 1990s.  Dial-up technology is slow while Inter-
net content and applications providers quickly demanded high speed solu-
tions for their residential customers.55  To meet that demand, the local tele-
phone companies began to offer DSL service.56  Third party DSL providers
demanded and received the right to lease local telephone company lines at
approved rates.57  The objective of such regulation was to increase the
speed of development by artificially creating a competitive situation where
the number of DSL suppliers was increased beyond the single local service
provider in a given area.58  Despite this regulatory boost, for various rea-
sons, DSL adoption failed to reach the desired goals.59
While the DSL technology path evolved, cable TV operators who al-
ready had wired access to residential households, developed their own
strategy of providing high speed Internet access to residential consumers
 49. Id. at 18.
 50. See id. at 19.
 51. See generally id. at 18-19.
 52. See generally Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688,
2695-97 (2005).
 53. 47 U.S.C. § 251(a)(1) (2006).
 54. See Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2696.  The net result is that since the physical connection to a resi-
dence represented a natural monopoly, this field should be regulated to provide reasonable access to all
interested parties, while informational services have little monopolistic market power merit little regu-
lation.
 55. See VALLE-RIESTRA, supra note 13, at 1-3; see generally FCC, Broadband Access for Consum-
ers, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/dsl2.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2006) [hereinafter FCC Fact
Sheet].
 56. See VALLE-RIESTRA, supra note 13, at 2-3; see generally FCC Fact Sheet, supra note 55.
 57. See generally Chris Sandlund, Pipe Dreams, BUSINESS W EEK ONLINE, Mar. 13, 2000,
http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/mar2000/te3670056.htm.
 58. See generally id.
 59. Broadband Blues, ECONOMIST, June 21, 2001, at 62.
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via cable modems.60  While cable modem service is similar to DSL service
functionally, there is one important difference in terms of distance limita-
tions.61  Both services provide high speed digital Internet access through
the use of add-on technology to existing wires into customer homes and
offices.62  DSL accomplishes this result by transmitting signals as an over-
lay to the traditional copper telephone wires.63  While high speeds can be
achieved, the technology has some built-in limitations in terms of the
maximum distance that a consumer can be located from the local telephone
exchange.64  By contrast, cable modem service technology exploits unused
channels on existing cable TV wires into a consumer home and office.65
This technology offers high speed service without the distance limitations
of DSL.66
III. THE BRAND X CASE
In the period after the enactment of the 1996 Telecommunications Act,
both DSL and cable modem providers rose to the market challenge to offer
high speed Internet access to the public.67  DSL providers, who were typi-
cally the “Baby Bell” companies,68 were subject to mandatory common
carrier regulation under Title II of the Communications Act.69  Accord-
ingly, as these Baby Bell companies deployed their DSL service to the
public, they were also required to provide non-discriminatory access to
 60. VALLE-RIESTRA, supra note 13, at 89-90; FCC Fact Sheet, supra note 55.  The Telecommuni-
cations Act recognizes three major types of communications-related services, namely: telecommunica-
tions services, information services, and cable services.  Cable services are defined as: “the one-way
transmission to subscribers of (i) video programming, or (ii) other programming service, and . . . sub-
scriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection or use of such video programming or other
programming service.”  47 U.S.C. § 522(6) (2006).  Cable TV operators were traditionally regulated
under the cable service regulatory provisions of the Act.  However, with the provision of cable modem
Internet access offerings, cable TV operators now also came under the scrutiny of the information
service regulatory regime, and potentially the telecommunications service regulatory regime.  See
VALLE-RIESTRA, supra note 13, at 78-79.  This is the crux of the Brand X case.
 61. See generally VALLE-RIESTRA, supra note 13, at 3.
 62. See generally id. at 2-3, 89-90.
 63. See id. at 2-3.
 64. See id. at 3.
 65. See generally FCC Fact Sheet, supra note 55.
 66. Similar results are being achieved and/or sought with high speed technology adapted for power
line wired connectivity, wireless connectivity, and satellite connectivity into homes and offices.
 67. See generally VALLE-RIESTRA, supra note 13, at 2-3, 89-90.
 68. “Baby Bells” is the vernacular term for the Regional Bell Operating Companies, which are
comprised of Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacific Telesis, Southwestern Bell Com-
munications, and U.S. West.  These companies were the local telephone companies that resulted from
divestiture of AT&T, pursuant to the AT&T Reorganization Plan.  See generally id. at 11.
 69. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2696, 2710
(2005).
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their own telephone wires to competing DSL providers.70  Thus, Earthlink,
despite not owning any wires to commercial offices or residential homes,
was legitimately able to provide DSL access to the next door neighbor of a
Verizon DSL customer.71  Earthlink obtained the necessary “connection”
or “telecommunications” component by leasing the use of Pacific Bell’s
telephone wires under the mandatory Title II access obligations.72
During this same post-Telecommunications Act period, however, the
FCC was silent on whether cable modem providers would also be subject
to Title II common carrier regulations.73  The key question was whether
cable modem providers would be deemed telecommunications service pro-
viders (like a local telephone company provider, e.g., Verizon), informa-
tional service providers (like Earthlink and America Online), or both.74
Finding that cable modem providers were telecommunications service pro-
viders would impose Title II common carrier obligations on them.75
Finally, in 2002, the FCC issued its declaratory ruling on third party
access to cables by independent ISPs.76  Under this ruling, cable modem
operators were not deemed telecommunications service providers and thus
were not required to provide leased access to their cables to third party
internet service providers (ISPs).77  The FCC’s reasoning was based on its
own 1998 Universal Service Report,78 which held that third party ISPs do
not offer telecommunications services (i.e., do not offer connectivity) but
merely use such services.79  Therefore, using the same reasoning, the FCC
concluded that cable modem providers, who market a “sufficiently inte-
grated” informational service offering, also do not offer any telecommuni-
cations capability but merely use such an embedded capability.80
The net result was a paradox.  DSL providers, who own their own fa-
cilities (i.e., who own the telephone wires making the connection to cus-
tomers), are required to lease access to their wires to competitors, but cable
 70. Id. at 2710.
 71. See id.; see generally Earthlink, Earthlink’s History, http://www.earthlink.net/about/hitory/
earthlink/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Earthlink History].
 72. See generally Earthlink History, supra note 71.
 73. Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2697.  It was not until September 2000 that the FCC commenced rule-
making on the issue of cable modem providers.  Id.
 74. See id.
 75. Id.
 76. FCC Cable Modem Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4819 (2002).
 77. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2697-98 (2005).
 78. In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501, 11532-33 (1998)
[hereinafter Universal Service Report].
 79. Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2697-98.
 80. Id. at 2705.  The term “sufficiently integrated” refers to the fact that a telecommunications
service, as well as an informational service, is embedded within the cable modem service offering.  Id.
at 2704-05.
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modem service providers are not required to lease access to their cable
connections to competitors.81
In response, Brand X, a Santa Monica ISP company whose business
model relied on the availability of leased access to cables connecting
commercial and residential consumers, sued the FCC to overturn its rul-
ing.82  The consolidated appeals relied on two separate grounds: (1) that the
rulemaking was contrary to the intent of Congress, as reflected in the Tele-
communications Act; and (2) that the rulemaking was arbitrary and capri-
cious in contravention of the Administrative Procedure Act.83
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the FCC’s
finding, ruling that the Ninth Circuit’s prior precedent was binding on the
FCC.84  That precedent adopted a “best reading” standard of statutory con-
struction for the ambiguous terms in dispute.85  Applying this standard, the
court determined that a cable modem service was indeed, in part, a “tele-
communications service,” as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 153(46).86
Quickly, cable modem operators sought and were granted certiorari by
the Supreme Court.87  In overturning the Ninth Circuit decision, the Su-
preme Court made two key rulings.  First, under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,88 a court’s precedent trumps an
authorized agency interpretation only when that court finds that the statute
compels a single unambiguous interpretation.89  As the Ninth Circuit did
not find the legislative meaning to be unambiguous, the Ninth Circuit
could not therefore trump the agency decision.90  Thus, the FCC ruling was
entitled to deference.91  Secondly, a court must honor such deference even
if the agency ruling is not the best interpretation, provided the ruling is at
least reasonable.92
 81. Id.
 82. See id. at 2698.  Note that numerous lawsuits resulted from the FCC ruling, but the Ninth Circuit
was chosen by judicial lottery to hear the resulting appeals.  Id.
 83. Id. at 2695, 2710.
 84. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).  The prece-
dent relied upon by the Ninth Circuit was AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir.
2000).
 85. The key terms that were in dispute were “telecommunications,” “telecommunications service,”
“information service,” and “cable service.”  The “best reading” language comes from the Supreme
Court case.  Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2701
(2005).
 86. Brand X, 345 F.3d at 1132.
 87. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n  v. Brand X Internet Servs., 543 U.S. 1018 (2004) (granting
certiorari).
 88. 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
 89. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2688 (2005).
 90. Id. at 2701.
 91. Id.
 92. Id. at 2699.
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The Brand X decision rested on the ambiguity of the terms “telecom-
munications,” “telecommunications service,” and “information service” in
the Telecommunications Act.93  Under this statutory framework, the central
issue became: (1) whether cable modem suppliers unambiguously offer a
telecommunications service in the same way that the Baby Bell companies
such as Verizon do; or (2) whether they solely provide an information
service in the same way that Earthlink and America Online do.94  If it is the
former, then Title II common carrier obligations would apply to the cable
modem providers.95
Affirming the FCC ruling, the Supreme Court in Brand X determined
that cable modem providers do not offer telecommunications services as
defined by the Telecommunications Act, and, therefore, do not fall under
the mandatory Title II common carrier regulatory environment.96  Further,
according to the Court, even if a colorable claim of “offer” could be made,
the circumstances are sufficiently ambiguous as to require Chevron defer-
ence by courts to the FCC ruling.97
The Supreme Court also concluded that the FCC ruling was neither ar-
bitrary nor capricious within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure
Act, despite the clear conflict resulting between the burdensome regulatory
requirements imposed on DSL providers and the modest regulatory re-
quirements now imposed on the cable modem providers.98  Instead of
finding arbitrary or capricious rulemaking, the Court held that the FCC had
simply undertaken a “fresh analysis” of the problem.99
With this background in mind, the next Part analyzes the reasoning of
the Brand X decision.  This Note then discusses how this may affect the
future of broadband technology.100
 93. Id. at 2697.  Telecommunications is “the transmission, between or among points specified by the
user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as
sent and received.”  47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2006).  Telecommunications service is “the offering of tele-
communications for a fee directly to the public . . . regardless of the facilities used.”  Id. § 153(46).
Information service is “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications.”  Id. §
153(20).
 94. Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2697.
 95. Id.
 96. Id. at 2695.
 97. Id. at 2705.
 98. Id. at 2711.
 99. Id.
 100. Infra Part IV.
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IV. BRAND X ANALYSIS
Because Brand X involves an agency’s interpretation of a statute, four
distinct aspects must be analyzed: (1) the administrative procedure; (2) the
text; (3) the historical context; and (4) the policy driving the decision.
A.  Chevron Background and Administrative Procedure Analysis
In legislation, gaps often exist in the statutory coverage.  These gaps
may be unintentional, where foresight does not anticipate a particular fact
scenario, or intentional, where Congress wishes to rely on the expertise of
an agency to create detailed rules for various factual scenarios.101  Chevron
addressed this issue by determining what level of deference should be af-
forded an executive agency when it acts in the rulemaking capacity af-
forded to it by Congressional legislation.102  Chevron held that if a statute
is ambiguous and the authorized agency’s clarification of that ambiguity is
reasonable, then a court is required to accept the agency’s determination.103
Chevron provided a two-step process for a court to use in determining the
appropriate deference to give to the agency.104  It specified that the court
should first consider the plain meaning of the statute in question.105  If its
meaning directly addresses the question at issue, then the court simply
needs to rule as to whether the agency decision is consistent with that in-
terpretation.106  If, however, the court determines that the statute is am-
biguous, then Chevron requires that the court must determine the reason-
ableness of the agency’s decision, and defer to such an interpretation only
if it is reasonable.107  Of course, in the absence of a prior agency decision,
the courts are free to make their own interpretation of an ambiguous stat-
ute.108
In order for an agency to rely upon Chevron, the agency must act
within its jurisdiction,109 must follow valid rulemaking procedures (in-
cluding a period for public comment), and must make a reasonable inter-
 101. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
 102. Id. at 865-66.
 103. Id. at 843-44.
 104. Id. at 842-43, 845.
 105. Id.
 106. Id. at 842-43.
 107. Id. at 843-44.
 108. Id at 843.  However, should the primary jurisdiction doctrine apply, then courts should require
that the cause of action be heard in the relevant agency, either before or instead of, an action in court.
See United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1956).
 109. For example, the Internal Revenue Service can fill in gaps in the taxation statutes (i.e., Title 26)
but cannot fill in gaps within the patent statutes (i.e., Title 35).
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pretation.110 Once it meets these requirements, the agency has broad
authority.111  The agency is not required to choose the best interpretation,
nor may it be prevented from changing its interpretation at a later date.112
However, should an agency change its interpretation, it must explain the
inconsistency; an unexplained inconsistency may invoke a judicial finding
of unreasonableness.113  Even if a court finds an agency’s decision unrea-
sonable, the agency can cure this flaw by correcting its rulemaking proc-
ess.114  The agency can then promptly re-assert its old decision, this time
backed by an improved process.115  Thus, the sequence of an agency deci-
sion (versus a court decision) is irrelevant to the supremacy of an agency
decision.116  Hence, in cases where a court rules before an agency, the
agency is free in a later decision to reach a different statutory interpretation
from that of the court.117  In cases where an agency makes an initial deter-
mination that is followed by a contrary court decision (holding that the
agency decision is unreasonable), the agency is free to cure the unreason-
ableness by addressing the rulemaking inadequacy.118  Only in a case
where a court makes a finding that a statute is unambiguous is the agency
prevented from making a contrary ruling.119
Consequently, under Chevron, administrative agencies have become
extremely powerful, despite the nominal constitutional protection of sepa-
ration of powers.120  In situations where the regulation of fast moving tech-
nologies is covered by necessarily broad statutes and where a high level of
technical sophistication and expertise is essential to making sound deci-
sions, agencies possess both legislative (rulemaking) and executive (en-
forcement) powers, while simultaneously enjoying substantial immunity
from judicial override.121  Only when an agency decision is determined to
be unreasonable, will its decision be overturned by a court of law.122  Con-
sequently, the traditional “checks and balances” protection embodied in the
 110. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
 111. Id. at 843, 845.
 112. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699-700 (2005).
 113. Id.
 114. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 209 (1947).
 115. Id.
 116. Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2700.
 117. Id. at 2699-701.
 118. See Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196, 209.
 119. Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2701-02.
 120. AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 5, § 13.7.2, at 481 n.47 (“the person who fleshes out the meaning
of the rule is the true law-giver in the circumstances”) (quoting Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen,
832 F.2d 408, 411 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.)).
 121. See generally id.
 122. Id. § 13.7.2, at 479-80 n.42.
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Constitution is limited to determinations of the “reasonableness” of the
agency’s efforts to construe ambiguous statutory provisions.123
If the judicial threshold for statutory “ambiguity” is high, courts will
retain a substantial role in the development of statutory interpretation.124
Conversely, if the threshold for statutory “ambiguity” is set very low, an
agency’s authority will be greatly expanded at the expense of substantial
judicial oversight.125  Congress also has a choice to make in drafting new
legislation, particularly in regulating areas involving complex technology
that is constantly changing in response to innovation.126  Congress could
attempt to minimize ambiguity by crafting narrow legislation that defines a
particular unambiguous meaning.  However, such a choice would likely
lock in a particular field of technologies and not provide an appropriate
framework that would cater to new and evolving technologies as they be-
come available.  Thus, in the telecommunications arena, it is reasonable for
Congress to use broad language, albeit with some vagueness, to describe
the statutory framework governing its desired scope of the regulation of
current and future telecommunications technologies.
Where such broad language results in a debate as to the plain meaning
of certain terms, courts “must look to the particular statutory language . . .
and design of the statute as a whole.”127  Consequently, a choice by Con-
gress to use broad language that triggers a claim of ambiguity should not
result in deference to an agency interpretation that is adverse to the broad
intent established by Congress.  “Such legislative regulations are given
controlling weight unless they are . . . manifestly contrary to the statute.”128
Therefore, it is difficult to rationalize the Brand X Court’s statement that
“[a]ny inconsistency bears on whether the Commission has given a rea-
soned explanation for its current position, not on whether its interpretation
is consistent with the statute.”129  As a general matter, while reasoned ex-
planations may adequately explain changing agency interpretations, such
interpretations should nevertheless be confined to the limits set by the
statutory framework.  Even fuzzy limits distilled from broad Congressional
language are nevertheless limits that should be respected by the other
branches of government and, in particular, by other agencies.
Another question of administrative procedure is raised by Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Brand X, where he states that “Article III courts do not
 123. Id.
 124. See generally id. § 13.7.3 (discussing cases in which two Supreme Court Justices examine the
same statutory language but have opposing determinations of ambiguity).
 125. See generally id.
 126. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
 127. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988).
 128. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
 129. 125 S. Ct. at 2711 (emphasis added).
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sit to render decisions that can be reversed or ignored by Executive offi-
cers.”130  As noted earlier, the Chevron precedent provides numerous ad-
vantages, particularly in a technocratic and dynamic industry such as tele-
communications.  Chevron enables the FCC to reach an opposing determi-
nation to that of a lower court, provided it meets the low threshold of rea-
sonableness.131  One could argue that a series of flip-flops in agency de-
terminations is prima facie unreasonable.  While that may be true, such an
analysis avoids a more pressing constitutional issue.
At its simplest, Chevron holds that where the statute is ambiguous and
the agency’s determination is reasonable, the agency, not a court, has the
ultimate authority to interpret the statute.132  This is in stark contrast to the
traditional role of Article III courts.133  The traditional role, in the absence
of an agency, is for the courts to be the final arbiters in interpreting a stat-
ute.  However, according to Chevron, where an agency is granted rule-
making authority under a particular statute, a reasonable agency interpreta-
tion will trump an interpretation by a court of law.134  In essence, the leg-
islature has not only delegated the agency certain rulemaking authority
(i.e., to fill in the meaning of statutory gaps) but it has also delegated the
power to make final interpretations of statutory meaning.135
Justice Kennedy recognized this dilemma in Brand X by noting that the
Supreme Court itself could rule that its interpretation was final by declar-
ing that the meaning was now unambiguous.136  Lower courts, however,
lack this ability.  Lower courts cannot simply declare that a statute is un-
ambiguous where Congress has explicitly authorized the relevant agency to
resolve an ambiguity.  Moreover, in addition to this “finality” problem,
courts are bound by stare decisis to provide a stable and predictable basis
from which the industry and the general public may make sound choices.
By contrast, Chevron permits, within reason, agencies to change decisions
as they see fit.137  While the agency’s expertise may rationally support such
changed interpretations, such changes create inefficiencies by undermining
public confidence in present statutory interpretations.
The above discussion addressed the generalized issues implicit within
the administrative framework outlined by Chevron.  With respect to the
particular facts of Brand X, the key administrative process issue became
 130. Id. at 2720 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
 131. Id. at 2699.
 132. 467 U.S. at 843-44.
 133. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803).
 134. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2700 (2005).
 135. See id.
 136. Id. at 2712 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing the need to give the Supreme Court itself a
way out of this constitutional predicament).
 137. See id. at 2711.
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the following: (1) whether Congress, when choosing the particular lan-
guage of the Telecommunications Act, intended a complete deferral to the
FCC to use its unique expertise to start with a clean slate and make rules
about the regulatory environment of telecommunications;  or (2) whether
Congress clearly revealed its biases in the type of regulatory environment
it desired for both current, as well as future, communications technolo-
gies.138  The first step in resolving this question requires a textual analysis
of the relevant portions of the Telecommunications Act.139
B.  Textual Analysis
The first step of textual analysis requires weighing the Brand X deci-
sion against the relevant statutory language and its requirements.  Specifi-
cally, Congress requires Title II common carrier regulation of telecommu-
nications service providers, for example, those providers who “[offer] tele-
communications for a fee directly to the public . . . regardless of the facili-
ties used.”140  In turn, telecommunications is defined to be “the transmis-
sion, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the
user’s choosing, without change in the form or content.”141  By contrast,
the less onerous obligations of the Title I regulatory scheme apply to in-
formation service providers, for example, those who offer “a capability for
generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utiliz-
ing, or making available information via telecommunications.”142  This
definitional framework contains two functional blocks under scrutiny,
namely a “telecommunications” functional block (i.e., the connection piece
between the consumer and the Internet) and an “information” functional
block (i.e., where information is modified, stored or otherwise proc-
essed).143  Telecommunications providers supply the former, while infor-
mation service providers supply the latter.144  In spite of this statutory dis-
tinction, information service providers must use telecommunications to
accomplish their mission.  The statute explicitly recognizes this when it
 138. See id. at 2700.
 139. See infra Part IV.B.
 140. 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2006).
 141. Id. § 153(43).
 142. 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (emphasis added).
 143. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2696-98 (2005).
The term “functional block” is not a term of art.  Rather it serves to highlight the fact that Congress
categorized the types of communication services based on the functionality provided, and not on either
the technical means used to provide such functionality or the identity of the provider.  See generally id.
 at 144.
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acknowledges that information service providers act “via telecommunica-
tions.”145
The key question for the Court was whether a cable modem provider,
who clearly provides an information service, also provides a telecommuni-
cations service.  The majority held that an information service provider is
not also de facto a telecommunications service provider, as telecommuni-
cations services are not offered.  In parsing the statutory sentence defining
a telecommunications provider, the majority focussed on the verb “of-
fer.”146  While the information service provider clearly gave the customer
telecommunications services, the majority determined that this did not
amount to an “offer” as the telecommunications capability was deemed to
be merely a component, and not a “stand-alone” separate product.147  In-
deed, as Justice Thomas further noted, while some ambiguity can exist as
to whether “offer” necessarily requires this particular interpretation, the
Court’s precedent requires deference to the FCC’s choice of possible alter-
native definitions.148
By contrast, Justice Scalia, in his dissent, noted that the more appropri-
ate focus is on the object of the verb “offer,” namely whether the telecom-
munications capability is sufficiently distinct as to be a separately “of-
fered” product, rather than a mere component of an integrated information
service product offering.149  Justice Scalia noted that when a pizza is or-
dered for delivery, both the delivery and the pizza are “offered” to the
public.150  Likewise, a pet shop that sells puppies on a leash offers both
puppies as well as leashes.151  Consequently, Justice Scalia reasoned that
both the telecommunications capability and the informational services
were “on offer” by the cable modem provider.152
The majority noted that the “question turns not only on the language of
the Act, but on the factual particulars of how Internet technology works
and how it is provided.”153  Accordingly, using their own analogy of car
sales, the majority illustrated the point that the fact that cars are sold does
 145. Telecommunications access is required in order to provide information service.  See id. at 2715
n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
 146. The predicate of the sentence, namely “telecommunications for a fee directly to the public . . .
regardless of the facilities used” did not figure prominently in Justice Thomas’s reasoning—rather he
acknowledged, as did the FCC, that what matters is what is “seen from the consumer’s point of view.”
Id. at 2703.
 147. Id. at 2704.
 148. Id. (referring to the deference afforded to the FCC in the interpretation of the meaning of the
word “cost” in Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 498 (2002)).




 153. Id. at 2705 (majority opinion).
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not require that engines and car frames are also “on offer.”154  When items
such as engines and car frames are so tightly integrated in the finished of-
fering, those items are mere ingredients and not separately “on offer.”155
Consequently, the majority held that the cable company’s telecommunica-
tions connection and the cable company’s informational services element
are “sufficiently integrated” such that it is reasonable to view the two ele-
ments as a single, integrated offering.  The tight integration supports the
“parts of a car” analogy rather than the “puppies and leashes” analogy.156
To bolster its decision, the majority noted that, not only are the two com-
ponents necessary for a cable modem service to perform, but that in any
event, there is ambiguity and the “parts of a car” analogy was a reasonable
choice for the FCC (and the Court) to make.157
In sum, textual analysis casts doubt on the Brand X decision because
the Congressional language does not create the type of ambiguity exploit-
able by the FCC.  Congress used broad language and therefore somewhat
generalized terminology.  For example, it did not wish to lock in a par-
ticular Internet connection technology.158  However, by virtue of Con-
gress’s expressly stated technology-neutral position, it is unreasonable to
permit the FCC to use the difference in the means of technological imple-
mentation as a vehicle to avoid common carrier regulation of cable modem
providers.
The Telecommunications Act explicitly defined types of communica-
tion services in terms of functionality provided and not in terms of tech-
nology used or identity of the provider.  In particular, Congress defined the
“connection functionality” to be the “telecommunication services” and
defined the “information functionality” to be the “information services.”159
A required component of the information services functionality is a tele-
communications capability in order to provide the connection to the end
customer.160  At the time of the legislation, Congress would have been
aware of at least two means of implementation of the telecommunications
building blocks (“connection technologies”), namely the slow dial up tele-
 154. Id. at 2704.
 155. Id.
 156. Id. at 2704-05.
 157. Id. at 2705.
 158. For example, Congress used the words “irrespective of the facilities used” in a bid to ensure that
the common carrier regulatory scheme would apply whether or not a different implementation scheme
would be employed.  47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (2006).
 159. Information service, being defined as “the offering . . . via telecommunications,” explicitly
represents that the information service uses “telecommunications.”  47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006).
 160. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2703 (2005).
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phone line service, and also the faster broadband service.161  Rather than
enumerate the various types of technologies used to implement the tele-
communications functionality, Congress instead chose to define the term
more broadly in terms of the functionality provided and specifically chose
not to tie the definition to a particular choice of technology.  The inference
can therefore be drawn that Congress intended to capture future telecom-
munications technologies under the same Title II regulatory umbrella.
Consequently, Congress’s deliberate choice of broad functional language
precludes the FCC’s choice of different regulatory schemes for the same
functionality.  Specifically, it is unreasonable for the FCC to require two
forms of telecommunications service (dial-up and DSL) to be regulated as
Title II common carriers while cable modem service providers escape such
regulation—given that the language of the Act is technology neutral, and
DSL and cable modem services both provide the same function of
broadband connectivity.
Despite the similarity in performance between a DSL service and a ca-
ble modem service, the FCC claims that history supports its regulatory
distinction between the two services, or at least provides sufficient ambi-
guity to require Chevron deference.162  Certainly, it is true that DSL service
providers have historically been regulated as common carriers as these
providers were the progeny of the AT&T divestiture.  However, the lan-
guage of the Act does not support a regulatory structure based on history.
Were such claims to be valid, the language of the Act would note the his-
torical status quo, e.g., describe specifically the incumbent technologies or
particular parties and their regulatory status as of the date of enactment and
specifically state that such regulatory status would continue.163  As noted
above, the statutory language does not, either implicitly or explicitly,
grandfather regulatory status for some parties based on their historical
standing.  On the contrary, the statutory language provides a framework
based on functionality, without reference to the specific technology used
and without reference to whether it has any historical preference.  The stat-
ute is clear—so long as a telecommunications service is offered, the tele-
communications service provider should be regulated in accordance with
the Title II regulatory scheme.
 161. The Senate Report notes that one witness at a hearing had noted that “the U.S. needs an inte-
grated broadband network.”  S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 12 (1995).  Dial-up service had been around for
many years at the time of the hearings.
 162. Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2711.
 163. By way of contrast, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 defines a rural telephone company as
an entity that “has less than 15 percent of its access lines in communities of more than 50,000 on Feb-
ruary 8, 1996.”  47 U.S.C. § 153(37)(D) (2006).
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Further, the Brand X Court invokes the “sufficiently integrated” test to
justify holding that the telecommunications element (the connectivity ele-
ment) of a cable modem service is not “on offer” within the meaning of the
Telecommunications Act.164  Certainly, hydrogen is not “on offer” when
water is “on offer,” as the hydrogen is sufficiently integrated in the wa-
ter.165  However, as the dissent notes, such an analogy is not always appro-
priate.166  Unbundling hydrogen and oxygen from water requires sophisti-
cation, energy, and effort.  Such is not the case with the telecommunica-
tions component and the informational services component of a cable mo-
dem service.  While these two components are integrated (indeed they are
tightly integrated in order to ensure interoperability), unbundling the com-
ponents is solely a question of marketing and not a question of difficult
engineering.  Quite simply put, integration does not shed any light on
whether individual components may be unbundled and are therefore “on
offer.”  If all integration could not be unbundled, then multiple manufac-
turers could not compete by building individual portions of a system and
vertical monopolies would be the order of the day.  Under the Brand X
Court’s “sufficiently integrated” holding, only Boeing would be able to
build the airframe, the engines, and the electronic systems of a modern
airplane, rather than subcontracting out the engines, as is the current prac-
tice in the aeronautical manufacturing industry.
Finally, the FCC maintains that the lack of a separate “stand-alone” of-
fering of telecommunications services provides dispositive evidence that
cable modem providers are not covered by Title II regulations.167  Cable
modem providers point to the bundling of telecommunications and infor-
mation services as their defense to the claim that they offer telecommuni-
cations services.168  However, by analogy, such a defense would necessar-
ily mean that wine suppliers would be immune from alcohol regulations
provided they always sell a pound of cheese with every bottle of wine, or
that dynamite suppliers would be immune from explosives regulations
provided they always sell a box of matches with every stick of dynamite.
Such a statutory reading leads to absurd results.  Moreover, it would be
unwise for a statutory framework to be so readily vitiated by simple mar-
keting decisions of the vendors concerned.  In particular, where providers
have exclusive service franchises, heightened regulatory scrutiny is vital to
protect the public from monopolistic effects.
 164. Brand X, 125 S. Ct. at 2704-05.
 165. Id. at 2714 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
 166. Id.
 167. Id. at 2703-04 (majority opinion).
 168. Id. at 2698, 2704.
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In summary, a textual analysis could have shown that the FCC was en-
titled to deference provided the Telecommunications Act supported such
deference.  However, while the Brand X Court found sufficient ambiguity
in the wording of the Telecommunications Act, a closer reading shows that
the language, while broad, was nevertheless sufficiently clear as to rule out
the conflicting interpretation offered by the FCC in its rulemaking capac-
ity.
C.  Historical Analysis
An analysis of the history of the enactment of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 provides some insight into the probable expectations of Con-
gress when it modernized the communications statutes.  The Act incorpo-
rated the state of the regulatory history at the time of enactment.  The most
important aspect of this history was the computer inquiries made by the
FCC over the previous decades, and, in particular, the resulting conclu-
sions, as reflected in its Computer II Rules.169  These rules established a
regulatory dichotomy between providing basic services and enhanced
services.  Specifically, “basic services” were defined to be “the common
carrier offering of transmission capacity for the movement of informa-
tion.”170  Such “basic services” were envisaged to be a pure transmission
capacity that did not affect the customer supplied information.171  Moreo-
ver, the definition did not in any way restrict the “carrier’s ability to take
advantage of advancements in technology.”172
By contrast, “enhanced services” were nothing more than “basic serv-
ices.”  As such, “computer processing applications which act on the con-
tent, code, protocol, and other aspects of the subscriber’s information”
provide enhanced services.173  The FCC’s report specifically identified a
“mail box” as an example of an enhanced service.174
As the Brand X Court noted, the “telecommunications service” and
“information service” definitions from the Act parallel the Computer II
definitions of “basic service” and “enhanced service” respectively.175  Ac-
cordingly, Congress used this regulatory dichotomy to require mandatory
regulation of basic services (i.e., the telecommunications services) while
only Title I regulation was required for enhanced services (i.e., the infor-
 169. In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second Com-
puter Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 417-23, ¶¶ 86-101 (1980) [hereinafter Computer II Rules].
 170. Id. at ¶ 93.
 171. Id. at ¶ 96.
 172. Id.
 173. Id. at ¶ 97.
 174. Id.
 175. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2697 (2005).
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mation services).176  Given these historical underpinnings for the regulatory
distinctions, it appears that provision of a connection from the home, via
cables, like traditional telephone wires, should fall on the “basic service”
side of the regulatory demarcation line.  Ironically, this straightforward
approach was used to extend the regulatory scheme from telephone wires
to include high speed DSL Internet connectivity.177
Since DSL Internet connectivity and cable modem Internet connec-
tivity are similar, it seems only logical to apply the same regulatory ap-
proach to cable modem connectivity as that in place for DSL connectivity.
However, the FCC chose a different regulatory path.  While the FCC is
entitled to change its mind, it cannot embark on a path that is in inherent
conflict with the statutory underpinnings and still be entitled to Chevron
deference.  Such conflict should be per se unreasonable.
D.  Policy Analysis
Analysis of any statute requires an examination of Congress’s objec-
tives in enacting the statute.178  In particular, it is essential to ensure that
the resulting plain language interpretations are consistent with the policy
objectives set forth by Congress.  In enacting the Telecommunications Act,
Congress sought to decrease regulation.179  Less regulation would spur
investment and growth in the infrastructure necessary for a broadband ca-
pability in the United States.180  In fact, the original need for regulation of
AT&T arose from a need to eliminate the undesirable economic effects of
a monopoly and to ensure that such services were provided on an efficient
non-discriminatory basis.181
If cable modem service was the only broadband access point into resi-
dences and commercial businesses, then monopolistic concerns would un-
doubtedly outweigh the objective of deregulation.  After all, concerns
about monopoly drove the original breakup of AT&T.182  The average con-
sumer, however, has multiple means of broadband access to the Internet.183
 176. Id. at 2696.
 177. Id. at 2711.
 178. KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 201 (1999)
(noting that the canons of statutory construction include “policy rules and presumptions” (quoting
WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994))).
 179. Congress’s stated intention in passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was “to promote
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for
American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunica-
tions technologies.”  See Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (1996).
 180. S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 1-2 (1995).
 181. See supra Part II.A.
 182. Id.
 183. See OECD BROADBAND STATISTICS, supra note 3.
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In addition to DSL and cable, the average consumer also has the possibility
of wireless access, power line access, and satellite connectivity to the In-
ternet.184  Given the multiplicity of access points to the Internet, the objec-
tive of deregulation is not hampered by any realistic concerns of monopo-
lization.  On the contrary, rapid expansion of broadband access technology
would best be served by providing broadband suppliers with the freedom
to develop the deployment of their technology with the expectation that
they are not obligated to share their facilities investment with potential
competitors.
E.  Summary of Analysis
In summary, both textual and historical considerations point to an un-
ambiguous interpretation of the Telecommunications Act.  Deference to
the FCC’s interpretation would therefore be inappropriate since its inter-
pretation falls outside the scope of the legislative mandate.  However, the
increase in the number of available methods of broadband access technolo-
gies favors the outcome offered by the FCC, and ultimately adopted by the
Brand X Court.  In the next five years, it will be interesting to observe the
increase in availability of broadband access within the United States to
levels more like those found elsewhere in the world.  It is worth noting that
to ensure parity between cable modem providers and DSL providers, the
FCC has already, subsequent to the Brand X decision, afforded DSL pro-
viders the same diminished regulatory environment in which to thrive and
offer products to consumers.185  The other legacy to monitor will be the
diminished burden that administrative agencies appear to have to meet in
order to merit Chevron deference.  Finally, on a constitutional note, it
would seem that too low a burden on an administrative agency’s rulemak-
ing authority would pose a threat to the checks and balances of a constitu-
tional system.
V. CONCLUSION
By deferring to the FCC ruling that cable modem providers are not of-
fering telecommunications services, the Brand X Court gave administrative
agencies extraordinary deference upon finding statutory ambiguity.  The
 184. Id.
 185. In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20
F.C.C.R. 14853 (2005), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-05-
150A1.pdf.  As a result of this order, DSL information providers are no longer required to make avail-
able the underlying telecommunications access capability.
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Court deferred to the agency despite the inconsistent regulatory treatment
of DSL and cable modem services, and despite the fact that the regulatory
framework is in conflict with the legislative framework.  The changing
economic circumstances, together with the FCC’s subsequent ruling lifting
the regulatory burden from the DSL providers, will possibly ensure ex-
panded broadband Internet access in the United States.  It is far from clear,
however, that the administrative means used comport with the constitu-
tional checks and balances envisioned for the three branches of govern-
ment.  Brand X supports: (1) very narrow readings of statutory text (a
service is not being “offered” when it is merely being “used”); (2) expan-
sive uses of policy (changing economic circumstances enable an agency to
take a “fresh analysis”); and (3) agencies’ prerogative to ignore legislative
alternatives (not choose the “forbearance” route when a narrow reading
allows one to re-define the problem out of existence).  While agency ex-
pertise is valuable, constitutional checks and balances are invaluable.  In
the future, the Supreme Court should not be so ready to hand the reins of
interpretation to the “fourth” branch of government.
